Tax Aspects of Alimony Trusts by unknown
TAX ASPECTS OF ALIMONY TRUSTS
ALL states require a husband to support his wife after divorce or separation.,
The prevalent methods of satisfying this obligation are direct periodic pay-
ments and lump sum settlements.2 The separate advantages of each of these
forms may be united in a third arrangement, a trust for the benefit of the wife.3
Like periodic payments, the alimony trust enables the husband to limit his
obligation to minimal legal requirements, for he may provide that the trust will
terminate upon the wife's remarriage, or the death of either party.4 So also
the alimony trust allows the husband to satisfy his obligation out of trust in-
come, while retaining control over the ultimate disposition of the corpus. Like
a lump sum settlement, an alimony trust frees the wife from the risks of fluc-
tuations in her husband's income,G and the hardships of enforcing compliance
with the alimony decree." Furthermore, the trust can relieve the husband from
further claims by the wife,1 and assure both parties that she will have a steady
income.
1. At common law the husband's obligation to support his wife did not survive the
marital relationship. However, statutes in all American jurisdictions today continue the
husband's duty after divorce. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 259 (1932) ; 2 NEL-
SON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 13 (2d ed. 1945); Paul, Five Years with Douglas v.
Willcuts, 53 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1939). In fifteen states the courts can also require the
wife to pay "alimony" to her husband. 2 VERNIER, op. cit. supra at 304. This Comment
will treat the husband as payor and the wife as recipient of alimony. However, where the
parties are interchanged the same rules apply. See INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a) (17).
2. See, generally, 2 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30.
3. Nelson states that a court may create a trust of the separate property of the hus-
band for the support of the wife. 2 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 151. However, the
case law authority holds only that the court could confirm a trust created by the parties
in a voluntary agreement. See Scott v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 125 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939). Cf. Wiedemann v. Wiedemann, cited in Karl T. Wiedemann, 26 T.C.
565, 566 (1956).
4. Johnson, Divorce and Federal Income Taxes, 37 MINN. L. Ray. 413, 422-23 (1953).
5. In many states divorce courts, either by statute or specific provision of the decree,
retain jurisdiction to modify or terminate provisions for periodic alimony payments. A
decrease in the earning power of the husband will generally warrafit such modification.
See KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 714-18 (3d ed. 1946).
6. A wife may enforce an alimony provision by contempt proceedings or execution.
2 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 284. Aside from the necessary delay and cost they in-
voke, both methods are ineffective if the husband leaves the jurisdiction and takes his
property with him. Id. at 296-97. The wife's only recourse in such a situation is to follow
the *husband to his new jurisdiction and institute suit there for a debt on a record. Ibid.
Such remedies offer little comfort to a woman who has no other means of support. See,
e.g., Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934) ; Haas v. Haas, 183
Misc. 870, 51 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Pokorny, Practical Problems in the En-
forcement of Alimony Decrees, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 274 (1939).
7. The parties may provide that the creation of the trust terminates the husband's
obligation. See, e.g., Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940); Helvering v. Leonard, 310
U.S. 80, 84 (1940).
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Because of these features, the alimony trust may serve as an attractive
compromise where one party desires a lump sum settlement and the other wishes
periodic payments. Nor is the use of an alimony trust limited to the very
wealthy. The agreement may obligate the husband to augment the initial
corpus by periodic transfers, and give the wife the right to draw a stipulated
sum from income or principal. The trust can also be employed solely as securi-
ty for payments to the wife.
Unless drafted carefully, however, the alimony trust may combine the un-
favorable tax consequences of both periodic payments and lump sum settle-
ments. The same alimony trust may subject its grantor to adverse income, gift
and estate tax treatment. This Comment will consider the tax problems from
the creation of the trust to the death of the husband.
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CREATION
Realization of Gain
The transfer of property by the husband to the alimony trust may be deemed
a taxable sale. Conventionally, a debtor who satisfies his debt with property is
taxed on the difference between his basis for the property and the amount of
debt satisfied." By analogy, a husband who transfers property, directly or in
trust, to satisfy his marital obligation may realize gain on the transaction. 9
However, the usual measure of gain-value of the debt extinguished less the
basis of the property-is unworkable in the marital settlement situation. For
the debt, consisting of the marital rights of the spouse, cannot be evaluated
accurately.'0 Accordingly, the courts presume that the parties bargained at
8. See, e.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); E. F. Simms, 28
B.T.A. 988, 1029-33 (1933); Richard B. Gump, P-H 1941 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. ff 41034.
9. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942) (direct payments) ; Com-
missioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941) (same). Cf. Edna W. Gardner Trust, 20
T.C. 885 (1953) (basis of property in alimony trust). If the trust is only security for
satisfaction of the husband's obligation, it is arguable that the obligation is not satisfied
until corpus is actually paid over to the spouse. This reasoning would defer recognition
of gain from creation to the moment of actual satisfaction.
The gain will ordinarily be taxed at capital gains rates. However, if the parties are
still husband and wife at the time of the transfer and depreciable property is transferred,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1239(a) requires recognition of the gain as ordinary income.
Wiles, Tax Problems in Connection with Divorce, 42 A.B.A.J. 528, 531 (1956).
The unusually small number of cases on recognition of gain on creation of a property
settlement call for some explanation. A reason may be that taxpayers are not apt to report
such transactions in their tax returns and consequently the matter has not come under the
scrutiny of auditing revenue agents. See Johnson, Divorce and Federal Income Taxes, 37
MINN. L. Rzv. 413, 425 (1953). Another possible explanation is that the Commissioner
may prefer to levy a gift tax on the settlement and pick up the appreciation when the
property is subsequently sold. However, the most logical conclusion seems to be that tax
lawyers accept the results of the few decisions and consequently advise their clients either
to use cash or to pay the tax without question.
10. "What is the measure of the value of the wife's right to maintenance and support?
It is dependent upon many factors-the financial success or failure of the husband,
his generosity, the thrift or acquisitiveness of the wife, the length of life of both
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arm's length for the settlement and that the considerations exchanged were of
equal value." So viewed, the taxable gain is the difference between the basis
of the property and its fair market value at the time of the transfer. The Tax
Court has held, however, that if the parties set a value for the property which
differs from its fair market value, the agreed-upon valuation will be adopted
for tax purposes.' 2 As a safeguard against fraudulent stipulations, this rule
should be limited to situations where market value is uncertain and the stipu-
lated value appears reasonable.
If the wife is not the sole beneficiary of the trust, a different approach seems
proper. Frequently, the wife is designated income beneficiary only and a third
party is named remainderman. In Edna W. Gardner Trust 13 the Tax Court's
holding suggested that as long as the husband established such a trust in satis-
faction of the wife's marital rights, the transfer should be viewed as a sale of
the entire corpus, the husband recognizing gain on any appreciation on the
transferred property. This holding would be correct only if the wife caused
the husband to funnel part of her settlement off to remaindermen, so that she
rather than the husband should be considered donor of the principal. Other-
wise the wife receives merely the income from the appreciated property and
not the property itself in exchange for the relinquishment of her marital rights.
Of course, on the same sale principles, the husband could be held taxable for
the transfer of these income rights. It has been held that a person who sells
income rights in his property realizes gain in the amount of the consideration
less any allocable basis.14 But the Code provides that a husband is not taxable
on current income assigned through a trust to his wife as alimony.15 Thus in
the alimony context, even if the transfer of income rights to the wife is con-
sidered a sale, this sale represents merely an accelerated realization of income
that is not taxable to the husband. Accordingly, the husband should not
parties, the rise and fall of markets.... And how shall we evaluate the statutory
right of a 57-year old wife to share in the estate of her 45-year old husband? It is
also dependent upon many factors-the value of the husband's property at death, the
number of issue then living, and the death of the husband prior to the death of the
wife. ..."
L. W. Mesta, 42 B.T.A. 933, 940 (1940), rev'd, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
11. See cases cited note 9 supra; Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir.
1950); Edna W. Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. 885 (1953) ; Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
12. Cristina de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949), aff'd, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir.
1950) ; Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947). If the amount set varies greatly from the market
value, the Commissioner can probably upset the parties' figure by arguing that the dis-
parity negates any inference of arm's length bargaining.
13. 20 T.C. 885 (1953). This case involved a dispute over the basis of property in an
alimony trust. The trustee claimed that the basis was the fair market value at the time of
the transfer, since the transaction was a sale. The Commissioner argued that the transfer
was a gift. The holding that the basis was fair market value means that the husband
should have realized gain upon the transfer.
14. Estate of Johnson N. Camden, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.
1943).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 682. For a discussion see notes 64-66 infra and
accompanying text.
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recognize gain on the creation of an alimony trust if the principal of the trust
is not given to the wife or her appointee.
Even though the principal is given to a third party, the wife may be con-
sidered a beneficiary of part of the principal if she has the power to invadc
corpus in the event of an income deficiency. The consideration given to the
wife consists of the property that will be withdrawn as well as the income
rights, and, under the sale theory, the husband should be taxed on the appre-
ciation of this portion of the corpus. It will undoubtedly be difficult to asses-,
the amount of principal that will be invaded; only if the wife is assured a
stipulated sum annually, and the income of the trust is fixed and demonstrably
insufficient, can the amount of property that will be withdrawn be predicted
with any accuracy. The mere existence of the power to invade should not be
regarded as grounds for charging the husband with gain if the income from
the trust seems sufficient to cover payments to the wife. However, if future
income is speculative, but considerable invasion seems probable, the amount of
corpus sold to the wife should be estimated. The husband owning appreciated
property should consider this tax factor in choosing a suitable trust: for the
cost of creating an alimony trust with sufficient principal to pay the wife from
its income may be little more than the cost of funding a smaller amount and
allowing the wife to draw from both principal and income.16
It does not follow that a loss would be allowable to the husband if the basis
of the property exceeds its value at the time of the transfer. Where the wife is
income beneficiary only, the reasoning that frees the husband from recognition
of gain should also preclude his deduction of loss.'1 But even if the corpus is
transferred to the wife, section 267, disallowing deductions of losses from sales
or exchanges between spouses or between the grantor and fiduciary of any
trust, will usually bar the recognition of loss.' s In view of this provision, the
16. Assume, for example, that the husband must pay $20,000 a year to a wife with a
life expectancy of forty years. Assume also that the trust will earn 4% per year. To pay
the wife from income only, the husband must fund $500,000. But no gain need be recog-
nized because invasion is improbable. Now assume that the husband sets up a self-liqui-
dating trust, that is, a trust fund that will be exhausted by payments of $20,000 annually
from principal and income for 40 years. The corpus of such a trust must be approximately
$395,000. Since the wife will withdraw all the corpus over the life of the trust, apprecia-
tion must be recognized. If the appreciation is 100% and the gain is taxable at capital
gain rates, the husband must pay a tax of approximately $50,000. This means that the
cost of funding a self-liquidating trust is only $55,000 less than the cost of funding a trust
whose corpus of $500,000 will be intact at the end of 40 years. Moreover, if the same an-
nual alimony, life expectancy and appreciation are assumed but the interest is fixed at 5%
rather than 4%, the cost of a self-liquidating trust will be only $3,000 less than the cost of
a trust distributing merely income. The difference in the cost of the two types of trust
may be computed on standard annuity tables for any set of variables.
17. See text at notes 13-15 supra.
18. INT. Rav. Cona OF 1954, § 267(a), (b) (1),(4), (c) (4). The transfer will escape
§ 267, if viewed as a sale to the beneficiary who under state law is no longer married to the
transferor at the time of transfer. The husband should then be entitled to a loss deduction.
Section 165 (c) allows an individual to deduct his losses if they are incurred in a transaction
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husband seeking a loss deduction should sell his depreciated property in the
open market and fund the trust with cash.
Gift Tax
The transfer of money or property in settlement of a wife's marital rights
may also be classified as a gift for gift tax purposes. Section 2516 of the 1954
Code expressly immunizes some types of marital settlements from the gift
tax.19 However, in order to qualify under this section, a transfer must satisfy
the following requirements: (1) there must be a written agreement, (2) rela-
tive to marital property rights, (3) in settlement of the spouse's marital or
support rights or a reasonable allowance for the support of their minor chil-
dren; and (4) divorce must occur within two years thereafter. Thus the gift
tax consequences of the many types of non-qualifying marital transfers, in-
cluding those by parties who are legally separated rather than divorced, must
be determined by pre-existing law. Prior to section 2516, the only statutory
guidepost was a provision defining a taxable gift as any transfer for less than
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 20 Because of
the absence of a more precise expression of legislative intent, the treatment
of marital settlements, in trust or otherwise, has turned primarily on judicial
views of the purposes of the gift tax.
The gift tax initially was viewed as a tax on all inter vivos transfers that
would deplete the donor's estate and thus deprive the government of the estate
tax.2 1 The Code provides that testamentary transfers in consideration of the
release of dower or other marital rights in the husband's property are subject
to the estate tax.2 Therefore, inter vivos transfers in satisfaction of these
same rights should be subject to the gift tax.2 3 By this reasoning, however,
transfers in satisfaction of a wife's right to support are not taxable gifts, for
these sums are payable during the husband's life and therefore will not be part
of his taxable estate. Following this approach, the Commissioner announced
in ruling E.T. 19 that marital settlements would be considered taxable gifts
entered into for profit. In general, classification as a "transaction entered into for
profit" requires only that the property be acquired or held with intent to realize income
or make a profit on resale. Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996, 998 (3d Cir. 1940).
While it has also been held that the disposition itself must meet the "profit" test, an arm's
length sale satisfies this condition. Feine v. McGowan, 188 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Evans
v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958, 962 (3d Cir. 1940). See 5 MERTENs, FEDERAL INcOME TAXA-
TION § 28.34 (Zimet & Ness ed. 1956).
19. There is no requirement under this section that a settlement be incorporated in a
divorce decree or even submitted to the divorce court for approval.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1002, 53 STAT. 146 (now IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512
(b)). See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXES 636 (1956).
21. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945); Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
22. Revenue Act of 1932, § 804, 47 STAT. 280 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043
(b)).
23. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1st
Cir. 1941).
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to the extent that they exceeded the reasonable value of the wife's right to
support.2 4
Courts sharing this view of the gift tax as a means of complementing the
estate tax carried the rationale underlying E.T. 19 further. Since the Code
permits a claim based on a decree of a divorce court to be deducted from the
husband's estate without inquiry into the adequacy of consideration,25 an inter
vivos transfer pursuant to a divorce decree will not deplete the transferor's
taxable estate. Thus, a gift tax should not be imposed.26 The Commissioner
contested this result where the divorce decree merely approved a pre-existing
agreement of the parties. Nevertheless, the courts held that the transfer was
not a taxable gift as long as the agreement was merged in the divorce decree.2 T
This exception, however, did not cover court-approved agreements that pro-
vided for transfers prior to the divorce decree and that survived the decree;
and transfers pursuant to such agreements remained taxable as gifts. 28
A somewhat altered view of the gift tax can be traced to the Supreme
Court's 1950 decision in Harris v. Commissioner.29 The parties had settled
their respective property interests by an agreement made contingent on the
granting of an absolute divorce. However, the agreement stipulated that it
was to survive any divorce decree. The agreement was submitted for approval
to the divorce court, which had the duty of making a fair and equitable dis-
position of the property of the parties. The settlement was approved and in-
corporated into the divorce decree. The Commissioner then assessed a gift ta-
against -the wife on the excess of property she gave the husband over what she
received. The Supreme Court held no gift tax was due. The reasons given for
24. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166. A few earlier estate tax cases had held that the
release of support rights was not consideration for estate tax purposes, but the Commis-
sioner declined to follow them. Id. at 168. This ruling held that the Bureau would make
an allocation of the settlement between support and inheritance rights, in the absence of
a "reasonable allocation by the parties." Id. at 169.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(c) (1) (A) requires a showing of consideration for
estate tax deductibility of claims against the estate only where the claim is "founded on a
promise or agreement." For the proposition that payments pursuant to a divorce decree
are not so founded, see Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Commis-
sioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942) ; Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F.
Supp. 552 (N.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944); Silas B. Mason Estate, 43
B.T.A. 813 (1941). See notes 104-13 infra and accompanying text.
26. Commissioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947) (settlement modification
during trial was litigated in the divorce action).
27. William B. Harding, 11 T.C. 1051 (1948); Edward B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543
(1948) (holding E.T. 19 invalid insofar as it embraces such transfers) ; Albert v. Moore,
10 T.C. 393 (1948) ; Clarence B. Mitchell, 6 T.C. 159 (1946) ; Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207
(1943). See also Lasker v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943). But cf. Clarissa
H. Thomson, P-H 1947 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 471.94.
28. Commissioner v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949) (payment for
husband's interest in wife's property) ; Krause v. Yoke, 89 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. W. Va. 1950)
(agreement consummated before entry of divorce decree).
29. 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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this conclusion were: the agreement was contingent on divorce;3° the actual
property transfer was effected by the court decree rather than by the parties ;"1
the agreement was approved by a court which was obligated to decree a just
property settlement ;32 and the circumstances were similar to a bargain and
sale in the ordinary course of business.
33
Subsequent decisions have accented various factors in the Harris case as
determinative. Thus, the First Circuit follows Harris only where the actual
property transfer cannot take place until after the divorce decree has been
rendered ;34 the Second and Ninth Circuits rest Harris on the approval of the
agreement by a court which state law required to make an equitable distribu-
tion of the parties' property.35 Apparently, such approval is deemed to be a
guarantee that the husband has agreed to transfer to his wife no more than the
minimum required by law.
However, the tenor of Harris seems to be that the gift tax aims primarily at
those lifetime transfers which are likely estate tax avoidance devices.2 6 Divorce
settlements are too drastic to be attractive for estate depletion purposes, even
though they may theoretically be so used. Therefore, whenever a divorce
actually occurs, a transfer in settlement of the rights of the parties, like a
property division upon the dissolution of a partnership, is not a taxable gift.37
This philosophy is also inherent in section 2516's exemption of marital settle-
ments occurring within two years of divorce.38
The proposed Treasury regulations for section 2516 do not fully implement
this philosophy. Although these regulations do not treat 2516 as exclusive,
they allow a settlement not within the statutory language to escape the gift tax
only when the agreement is conditioned upon the entry of a court decree in-
corporating its terms.3 9 However, taxing all marital settlements not meeting
30. Id.at 110.
31. Id. at 111-12. The significance of this factor is diminished by the fact that a
$47,650 transfer was not incorporated into the divorce decree. Id. at 119 n.3 (dissenting
opinion).
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 112.
34. McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659, 664-65 (1st Cir. 1953).
35. Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131, 136 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Rosenthal v. Com-
missioner, 205 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23
T.C. 911 (1955).
36. For a statement of the avoidance-device theory of the gift tax see Pedrick, The
Gift Tax Jurisdiction of the Divorce Court, 46 ILL. L. REv. 177, 179-80 (1951). But see
Taylor & Schwartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L. REv. 19, 48
(1951):
"It may well develop that the cheapest way of making a substantial gift to a
member of the opposite sex . . . would be to enter into marriage with such person,
and shortly thereafter make the desired transfer by way of a property settlement
incorporated into a divorce decree."
37. The analogy to a partnership dissolution was one of the bases of the Harris
opinion. 340 U.S. at 112.
38. See text at note 19 supra.
39. Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1 (c) (1).
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the conditions of section 2516 or its regulations would set an illogical limita-
tion on the rationale underlying the section. Agreements pursuant to legal
separation furnish examples. Although legal separation usually does not ter-
minate the inheritance rights of the wife in her husband's property,4° separation
agreements often provide for their satisfaction. And in the majority of state,.
such agreements cannot be conditioned on the entry of a decree of separation.1
There is little danger, however, that separation agreements will be used aq
estate tax avoidance devices. Apart from the fact that tax savings offer an in-
sufficient incentive to disrupt a marriage, the estate tax now expressly permit.
the husband to leave half his property to his wife tax-free.42 Accordingly, if
settlements pursuant to legal separation were not taxable, a tax advantage
would be gained only if the parties reunited, and the wife received half of the
husband's remaining estate tax-free upon his death. But this danger would
appear to be no greater than the danger that a divorced husband may remarry
and leave half his estate tax-free to his new wife. Therefore, so long as the
parties have formalized their decision in a court decree, gift tax liability should
not turn on whether they are free to reunite.
The tax cost of failing to qualify under section 2516 or Harris is not offset
by any savings in the income tax treatment of the transfer. The classification
of the transfer to the wife as a taxable gift does not shelter the husband from
income tax liability for appreciation on the property at the time of the trans-
fer. 4' For the relinquishment of inheritance rights, which is not consideration
under the gift tax, is consideration for income tax purposes.4 4 Therefore if a
husband transfers appreciated property to his wife in settlement of dower in
a transaction not covered by 2516 or the Harris rationale, he may be deemed
to have made both a gift of the property for gift tax purposes, and a sale for
income tax purposes. The dual taxation of a marital settlement can be ration-
alized under orthodox tax theory by viewing the single transaction as two
separate transfers. If, instead of donating the appreciated property to his wife,
the husband had sold it on the open market and transferred the proceeds of
the sale to his wife, he would be liable for an income tax on the gain from the
sale, and a gift tax on the transfer of the proceeds. The tax cost of this dual
40. 2 VERNIER, A-ERIcAN FAMILY LAWs 482 (1932).
41. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 489 (2d ed. 1945).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
43. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
44. Compare Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) (re-
lease of dower is consideration for income tax purposes), with Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S.
308 (1945) (release of dower is not consideration for gift tax purposes). See also Frank,
J., in Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942):
"At the bottom of respondents' contentions is this implied assumption: The same
transaction cannot be a completed gift for one purpose and an incomplete gift for
another. Of course, that is not true .... Perhaps to assuage the feelings and the
understanding of affected taxpayers, Congress might use different symbols to describe
the taxable conduct in the several statutes, calling it a 'gift' in the gift tax law, a
'gaft' in the income tax law, and a 'geft' in the estate tax law."
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classification may be partially mitigated if under state law the parties are
deemed husband and wife at the time of the transfer,45 and if the wife is given
more than a life estate. For the Code permits a husband in computing gift
tax liability to deduct half the value of an interminable interest given to his
wife.40
The duality in classification also complicates the problem of assigning a basis
to the transferred property. Section 1015(b) provides that the basis of prop-
erty acquired by a transfer in trust shall be the same as it would be in the
hands of the grantor, increased by the amount of gain he recognized on the
transfer.4 7 Therefore, the beneficiaries of an alimony trust profit from any in-
come tax the husband is forced to pay on creation. However, section 1015 (a)
provides that property transferred in trust by gift shall retain the basis it had
in the hands of the grantor. 48 In view of this provision it is arguable that a
transfer of appreciated property which is both a sale for income tax purposes
and gift for gift tax purposes does not receive a stepped-up basis. It is more
consistent with the policy of 1015(a), however, to hold that if one party has
recognized gain for income tax purposes the beneficiaries need pay tax only
on the accretion which has not been previously recognized.4 9
Apart from the treatment accorded the settlement of the wife's interest,
provisions in an alimony trust for the benefit of the children of the parties may
give rise to gift tax liability. Reasonable payments for the support of the chil-
dren during their minorities, like payments for the support of the wife, are
deemed made for a valuable consideration 50 However, payments in excess of
45. See KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 305 (3d ed. 1946) :
"An absolute divorce . . .is a full and complete dissolution of the marriage tie,
abrogating all marital rights and obligations and leaving both parties to all intents
and purposes, single persons....
"[A] mere legal separation .. .simply . . .[frees] the innocent party from the
presence and control of the guilty one until they agree to renew cohabition."
46. I NT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2523. However, this section will be of little help in
the trust situation because the interest of the wife must not be a "terminable interest."
See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv.
1097, 1140-47 (1948).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(b).
48. Id.§1015(a).
49. See Edna W. Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. 885 (1953), allowing an increased basis for
stock in trust, even though the wife had only a life estate and the trust agreement stated
it was a "voluntary gift." This decision was acquiesced in only as to pre-1932 transfers.
1953-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
The term "gift" in the basis sections seems to refer to a gift in the common law sense
of donative intent, rather than a transfer for less than adequate and full consideration.
LOWNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES 753-57 (1956). Where property
is transferred directly to the wife pursuant to a settlement, courts have generally allowed
her to use the increased basis. See Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950) ;
Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C.
53 (1947) ; cf. Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947) ; John S. Thompson,
22 T.C. 275 (1954) ; Gordon R. Edwards, P-H 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. II 54117.
50. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2516(2). See Commissioner v. Weiser, 113 F.2d 486
(10th Cir. 1940) ; Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940).
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the reasonable value of minor children's rights to support or payments for
adult children are subject to the gift tax.51 And the amounts which the parties
have set out for the support of their minor children will not be taken as a rea-
sonable valuation of these rights, since the parties are not deemed to deal at
arm's length where the support of their children is involved.r 2
If the provision made for the children is a remainder interest, that portion
of the trust should ordinarily be deemed a gift. Clearly, if other sums set aside
for their support are sufficient, the remainder interest is without considera-
tion.53 If, however, the settlement recites that the remainder is the husband's
sole contribution to the children's support, such a designation should be
deemed the consideration for the children's rights to support only where the
remainder is readily marketable. Since the wife will not be able to use unsale-
able property for their support, it is more reasonable to assume that the
amounts allocated for the wife's maintenance include a sum for support of the
children. Having provided for the children, the husband should not be able
to pass a remainder to them under the guise of a provision for their support.
One exception to this view seems proper, however. If the husband can show
that the wife demanded as part of the consideration for her settlement that the
children be designated remaindermen, and if a transfer to the wife is protected
by 2516 or Harris, she should be considered donor of the remainder for gift
tax purposes.5 4 Thus the question is not whether any gift tax is due on the
remainder, but only who should pay it.
TAX ON TRUST IN cOME
The provisions for income tax on alimony payments made directly or
through a trust represent an effort to shift the liability from the husband to
the wife. Prior to 1942, alimony payments were treated like money spent for
51. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953); Hooker v. Commissioner,
174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Karl T. Wiedemann, 26 T.C. 565 (1956); Edmund C. Con-
verse, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945), aff'd on other grounds, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947).
52. Ronald M. Hooker, 10 T.C. 388, 391 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
Taxpayers have also argued that there should be no gift tax liability where the provisions
for the children were in a settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree. This
reasoning was accepted in John R. Geary, P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 43259, but it has
been repudiated in more recent decisions. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, su pra note 51;
Ronald M. Hooker, supra. And see Karl T. Wiedemann, supra note 51, where a gift tax
was assessed on the designation of an adult child as remainderman of an alimony trust,
even though the parties had no agreement and the trust was created by the divorce court
upon the "suggestion" of the taxpayer.
53. Hooker v. Commissioner, supra note 52.
54. Cf. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), and Ruth L. Lehman, P-H 1955 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 55229 (allowing husband to deduct and requiring wife to report payments
made to wife's mother by husband pursuant to marital settlement). See also John R.
Geary, P-H 1943 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 42259 (fact that wife requested designation of children
as remaindermen stressed in holding husband not liable for gift tax). Viewed as part of
the wife's settlement, the remainder to the children should have the same tax consequences
as an outright transfer to the wife. Thus if the conditions of Harris or 2516 are not met,
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the wife's support during the marriage. The husband could not reduce his in-
come by the amount so expended and the wife did not recognize the alimony
as income. 5 Similarly, the income from alimony trusts was taxable to the
husband rather than the wife,5 6 unless creation of the trust absolutely dis-
charged his obligation.5 7 In 1942, however, Congress amended the Code to
place the income tax burden of alimony payments on the wife ;5 tax liability
for payments made to support minor children remained on the husband.5 9 This
congressional purpose was effectuated differently for alimony trusts than for
direct payments, and the distinction may be a crucial factor in choosing between
these two arrangements.
The scheme for the taxation of direct alimony payments is embodied in
complementary provisions for recognition of income by the wife and deduction
from income by the husband. The wife is taxed on periodic payments of
alimony made pursuant to divorce, separation or support decrees, or pursuant
to a written separation agreement.0° Even payments that are derived from the
the remainder may be a taxable gift from the husband. In theory, the wife would then
also pay a gift tax on the remainder since she has donated the husband's gift to the chil-
dren. But inasmuch as the two gifts are merely constituent parts of one transaction, the
imposition of gift tax liability on the husband should bar a claim against the wife.
55. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). See, generally, Gornick, Alimony and the
Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 28-39 (1943) ; Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts,
53 HAIIv. L. Rzv. 1 (1939).
56. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940) ; Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935)
Mary R. Spencer, 20 B.T.A. 58 (1930). The Treasury had first ruled that alimony trust
income was taxable to the husband. Within a year it revoked this ruling and stated the
wife was to be taxed. Still later, the Treasury returned to its original decision. Gornick,
Taxation of Alimony Trusts, 20 TAxEs 529 (1942).
57. Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80 (1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69
(1940). See, generally, Paul, supra note 55. The husband remained taxable on amounts
actually used to support his minor children. Arthur Letts, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 1172 (1940);
Francis duPont, P-H 1940 B.T.A. Mfem. Dec. If 40307.
58. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942) ; Gornick, Alimony and the
Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 28 (1943). Another reason for the alimony amendment was
to eliminate disparities in tax treatment caused by differences in state law. Ibid.
59. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 22(k), 171 (a), as amended, 56 STAT. 816 (1942) (now
I N. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(b), 682(a)). The husband is taxable only where the pay-
ment is fixed by decree or agreement as payable for the support of his minor children. The
constitutionality of §§ 71 and 682 was upheld in Fairbanks v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1951) ; Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
978 (1950); Mluriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956); Daisy M. Twinam, 22 T.C. 83
(1954).
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71. Prior to 1954 the section required that payments be
pursuant to a decree of divorce or legal separation. Relief was not extended to husbands
making alimony payments under a voluntary agreement. The purpose of this limitation
was to prevent income tax evasion by a fraudulent agreement which would divide the in-
come of the husband into two lower tax brackets. See Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
446, 448 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 28, 40
(1943); Note, 47 Mici. L. REv. 726 (1949). However, this objection to deduction of
voluntary payments was removed by passage of the joint return amendments, expressly
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husband's principal or tax-exempt securities constitute income to the wife.,"
On the other hand, the husband can deduct all amounts recognized by his
wife.62 However, satisfaction of the alimony obligation by installments pay-
able within a ten year period is considered a division of the husband's prop-
erty rather than a plan for periodic payments from his income, and accordingly
the payments are neither taxable to the wife nor deductible by the husbandY.
Alimony trusts are divided into two categories for income tax purposes:
those created pursuant to the alimony agreement and pre-existing trusts em-
ployed to satisfy the alimony obligation. Section 682, dealing with pre-exist-
ing trusts, provides that the wife may be taxed only upon distributions from
the income of the trust.0 4 Section 71, governing trusts incident to divorce or
separation, seems to require the wife to recognize all payments from the trust.
including those from principal and tax-exempt securities. 5 Both sections pre-
scribe the same treatment for the husband: the alimony distributions to his
wife are not includible in his income.60
sanctioning income splitting by husband and wife. See, e.g., Rudick, The Tax Aspects of
Divorce, 9 U. CHY. L. ScHOOL CONFERENCES 17, 18 (1952):
"With tax rates at their present levels, the income-splitting privilege is so valuable
that the loss of a wife to upper-and even medium-bracket taxpayers means a
very significant increase in tax burden. Even with a deduction for alimony, the
parting of the ways entails a substantial tax cost."
61. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1942). Although it does not ex-
plicitly refer to tax-exempt income, § 71 has been interpreted to include all alimony pay-
ments, regardless of source. See Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956).
62. INT. R-v. CODE OF 1954, § 215. Vhere the payments continue beyond the death of
the husband, his estate may deduct them for income tax purposes. This is true even though
the estate may have previously deducted the commuted value of the wife's interest for
estate tax purposes. Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Laughlin's
Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Young, Tax Problems Involved in
Divorce, 1949 U. ILL. L. FORum 670, 692; G.C.M. 25999, 1949-1 Cu-r. BULL. 116.
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71 (c) provides that installments discharging an obliga-
tion, the principal sum of which is specified in the decree or agreement, are not treated as
periodic payments. If, however, the principal sum is or may be paid over more than ten
years from the decree date, the wife must include the payments to the extent they do not
exceed 10% of the principal sum each year.
It could be argued that § 71(c) would not require the wife to include payments from
an alimony trust which is to pay her for only nine years. In that case, § 71 (d) would
probably apply as well and the husband would have to recognize the trust income under
§ 677, since it discharges his legal obligation. See Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
64. Section 682 declares that the wife shall include "the income of any trust" that she
is entitled to receive. See 1942-2 Cums. BULL. 409-10.
65. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. Mannheimer, Tax Consequences of
Divorce Decrees, 40 IOWA L. REv. 543, 546 (1955). Where the trust is created from joint-
ly owned property, the wife must recognize payments attributable to her husband's interest
in full, but payments from her own share are taxed only to the extent they are from trust
income. This does not apply where the wife received her interest from her husband as a
gift in contemplation of divorce. Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (c) (4) ; Mannheimer,
supra at 545.
66. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 88 71(d), 682(a).
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The fact that direct periodic payments are included in the husband's gross
income and then deducted, while alimony trust payments are simply excluded,
is significant in the light of other deductions. Adjusted gross income will be
greater when direct payments are employed, because the alimony deduction is
not taken until taxable income is computed.6 7 Therefore, a taxpayer desiring
to obtain the largest possible charitable deduction should utilize direct alimony
payments.68 One whose charitable contributions are small but who is inter-
ested in maximizing his deduction for extraordinary medical expenses will
benefit more from the use of a trust.69 Similarly, a taxpayer who, in the
absence of alimony, would use the standard deduction should favor the trust
device, since the standard deduction will wipe out an alimony deduction, but
not an exclusion. 70
The deduction-exclusion distinction can be crucial where the husband is
beneficiary of a pre-existing trust that distributes corpus or tax-exempt in-
come. If he assigns his interest in such a trust to his spouse, she will receive
distributions from tax-exempt income and principal tax-free.71 If he retains
the beneficial interest and pays her a like amount, she will be taxed on these
payments. 72 He should then be entitled to deduct that amount from his taxable
income.73 An example 'will best illustrate this difference: The husband has
$20,000 income in one year, $10,000 wages and $10,000 income from a trust
funded with tax-exempt securities. His taxable income is $10,000. His
estranged wife demands $10,000 a year as alimony. If he assigns her his in-
terest as trust beneficiary, his taxable income remains $10,000 and she need
not include the amount in her income. If, however, he remains the recipient
of the trust and pays her $10,000 cash, he can presumably deduct the payment
and his taxable income is zero. Of course, the wife will never accept the same
dollar amount of taxable as non-taxable income: however, she should be will-
ing to accept the same amount after taxes in both situations. If the husband is
67. Id. § 211. See Vonderheit, Income-Tax and Gift-Tax Aspects of Divorce, 31
ORE. L. REv. 1 (1951).
68. Section 170(b) (1) (B) limits the charitable deduction to 20% of adjusted gross
income. See Rich, Recent Cases and Trends Involving the Alinony Deduction, N.Y.U.
6TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1088, 1093 (1948).
69. Section 213 (a) (1) allows the deduction of only those medical expenses in excess
of 3%, of adjusted gross income. See Rich, supra note 68, at 1093.
70. Section 63(b) provides that a taxpayer who elects the standard deduction may
deduct only exemptions and the standard deduction to compute his taxable income. See
Rich, supra note 68; Mannheimer, supra note 65; McDonald, Tax Aspects of Divorce,
Separation, Alimony and Support, 17 U. Pirr. L. REv. 1, 14 (1955).
71. I, T. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 103, 682; Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947),
acq. 1947-2 Cum. BULL 4.
72. Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956). See -note 61 supra and accompanying
text.
73. Section 215 allows the husband to deduct all amounts includible in the wife's in-
come under § 71. A deduction is disallowed for any amount which is excluded from the hus-
band's gross income by virtue of §§ 71 (d) and 682. But income from tax-exempt securi-
ties is excluded from the husband's gross income by § 103.
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in a higher tax bracket than the wife, the added amount of taxable income that
she will accept in lieu of tax-exempt income may be less than the sum which
he can free by taking the alimony deduction.74
This advantage of a deduction over an exclusion is magnified when the
husband creates the trust to satisfy his alimony obligation. The wife must in-
clude all payments from a section 71 trust in her income, but the husband gains
an exclusion only for the trust income otherwise taxable to him. 75 Thus. in-
sofar as the wife is paid from the trust corpus, the increase in her tax burden
is not matched by a corresponding deduction to her husband. In contrast, if
the husband named himself beneficiary of the trust and paid his wife a stipu-
lated sum directly, he would recognize only the income, but could deduct the
full amount of his alimony payments, including that derived from the distribu-
tion of corpus.76 From an income tax standpoint, therefore, it would be un-
wise for a husband to set up a trust, which, being insufficiently funded to pay
the wife from income, allows her to draw from principal and obligates the hus-
band to replenish the corpus periodically.
For similar reasons the husband should not fund a specially created alimony
trust with tax-exempt securities. Section 71 literally requires the wife to in-
clude "all payments" in her income, without regard to their source. Trust in-
come from tax-exempt securities should therefore be included in the wife's
income, even though prior to 1942 that income would have been taxable to
neither husband nor wife.77 And the husband is not given the offsetting deduc-
tion available if he had paid the alimony directly. In Anita Quinby Stewart,78
however, a case allowing the wife to exclude the tax-exempt income of a pre-
existing trust, the Tax Court confused the distinction between sections 71 and
682. While a dictum suggests that a wife may exclude the tax-exempt income
from both types of alimony trusts,79 this result is inconsistent with the language
of section 71.
74. *Assume that the husband has a taxable income of $20,000 and is, in addition, life
beneficiary of a trust yielding $10,000 tax-exempt income annually. Assume also that the
wife, having no other income, demands a yearly alimony payment that will yield her
$10,000 after taxes. If the husband assigns the trust income to her, his tax will be $7260.
If, however, he remains beneficiary of the trust, he will have to pay her $15,000 a year
which will be fully deductible. His tax will thereby be reduced to $1100. Thus, the direct
payment of $5000 more will save him $6260 in taxes, a net gain of $1260 per year.
75. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
76. See text at notes 60-62 supra; Starr, Alimony as an Income Tax Deduction, 27
TAXES 975, 983 (1949).
77. In Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864, 867 (1956), the taxpayer argued unsuc-
cessfully that she should not be taxed on sums that were not taxable to her husband be-
fore 1942. Her theory was that § 71 was intended merely to shift the income tax on sums
previously taxable to the husband.
78. 9 T.C. 195 (1947), acq. 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
79. The Tax Court apparently thought it was dealing with a case arising under § 71
(then Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(k)). It reasoned that the "last sentence" (actually a
cross reference provision) of 71 directed that all alimony trusts be covered by § 682(b)
(then § 171(b)). And, the court pointed out, § 682(b) required the wife to pay tax only
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There is no policy justification for treating section 71 trusts less favorably
than pre-existing trusts and direct payments. The requirement that a wife in-
clude all distributions from a section 71 trust in her income was patterned after
the provision for direct payments.80 This analogy to direct payments, how-
ever, is misleading. For the husband who pays his wife directly from his tax-
exempt income or principal is nevertheless entitled to a deduction. Since he
may use this deduction to offset other taxable income,"' it is reasonable to tax
the wife on direct alimony payments from the husband's non-taxable sources.
But the husband obtains no comparable reduction of taxable income when the
wife is paid by a trust from tax-exempt income or principal. Accordingly, the
recognition provisions of section 71, intended merely to shift the incidence of
the income tax,8 2 actually create a new source of taxable income. To align the
provision with its original purpose, section 71 should be amended by adopting
section 682's provision that the wife recognize only distributions of taxable
income from an alimony trust.8 3
Absent such an amendment, however, the husband can create an alimony
trust without income tax disadvantage. First, tax-exempt securities, priced to
yield a lower rate return than taxable securities, should not be purchased.
Second, even if the husband cannot afford to fund the trust adequately, he
should allow the wife to be paid only from trust income and bind himself per-
sonally to make up income deficiencies to a stipulated sum. This should be
acceptable to the wife tax-wise, since her tax consequences will remain the
same as if she were satisfied from trust corpus. However, the husband is able
where the beneficiary of any trust would do so. The fallacy in this reasoning is that it
would result in no tax liability to the beneficiary of a § 71 trust distributing corpus, a
result clearly contrary to congressional intent. See 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 409-10. This con-
fusion makes the Commissioner's acquiescence unclear. 1947-2 Cu-m. BULL. 4. Perhaps
he intended to limit his acceptance to the situation where a pre-existing trust is utilized.
However, he may have acquiesced in the reasoning as well as the decision.
80. Indeed, the provisions for alimony trusts created incident to divorce are incor-
porated in the same section that governs direct periodic payments. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 71 (a).
81. The improbable case of the husband who has no taxable income to offset against
the alimony deduction has arisen. In Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956), the tax-
payer's income consisted almost entirely of interest from tax-exempt securities. Since,
however, such cases are rare, a blanket rule requiring the wife to recognize income on
the payments from the tax-exempt income of her husband may be reconciled with the
Code's purpose of merely shifting income tax burdens on the ground of administrative
convenience.
82. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
83. The Senate had introduced alimony relief provisions in 1941. These provisions
treated all alimony trusts in the same manner, requiring the wife to recognize only trust
income. The 1941 revision was dropped in Conference Committee, with the understanding
that it would be dealt with in a later bill. 1 SEIDIMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
INCOM AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAws 1280-85 (1954). When the House later promul-
gated the 1942 alimony provisions, no reasons were given for the change in treatment of
trusts created incident to divorce. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942).
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not only to exclude all trust income, but also to deduct from his taxable income
any deficiencies that may arise.
8 4
ESTATE TAX
At least part of an alimony trust may be includible in the taxable estate of
the husband. Sections 2036 through 2038 provide that inter vivos transfers
not actually completed before the transferor's death are subject to the estate
tax. Section 2036 condemns transfers in which the transferor has retained a
life estate ;85 section 2037, transfers in which the transferor has retained a re-
versionary interest;80 and section 2038, transfers subject to a power of the
transferor to alter, amend or revoke.8 7 These sections do not apply to any
transfer that is a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." 88 However, since section 2043 provides that the
relinquishment of dower or other marital rights in the decedent's property is
not such consideration, 9 only the.portion of the alimony trust allocable to the
wife's right to support-legal consideration from the tax standpoint 90 -can
84. DuPont v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 978 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (the husband can de-
duct payments to supplement trust income under agreement incident to modification of
divorce decree).
85. Under the statutory language, he must retain possession and enjoyment of the
property himself or the right to determine who shall enjoy it. IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2036. See 1 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION 299-331 (1956).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035, dealing with transfers in contemplation of death, ha'
not been applied to alimony trusts. Where the dominant motive for a transfer, in trust
or otherwise, is a desire to settle property rights with an estranged wife, and thus to dis-
charge the husband of all other obligations toward her, the transfer has been consistcntly
held to be not "in contemplation of death." Cowles v. United States, 152 F.2d 212 (2d
Cir. 1945) (life insurance policies) ; Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp.
375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (life insurance) ; Estate of George F. Hurd, 9 T.C. 681, 687
(1.947) (life insurance). Cf. Stackpole v. Granger, 136 F. Supp. 382, 389 (W.D. Pa.
1955) (trusts for children).
86. The section has a dual requirement: the beneficiary must not be able to enjoy his
interest unless he survives the grantor and the grantor must have a reversion that is worth
at least 5% of the value of the property just before his death. 1 BEVERImE, FEDERAL
ESTATE TAXATION 391-408 (1956).
87. This power is condemned whether the settlor possesses it alone or in conjunction
with any other person. 1 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION 430-36 (1956).
88. This exception is contained in each of the sections.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043(b).
90. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166. Early cases had held that support rights were
"other marital rights" in the husband's estate and applied the 2043(b) prohibition to them.
Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Meyer's Estate v.
Helvering, 110 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940). The Commissioner, however, decided not to
follow these cases in the divorce or legal separation context. E.T. 19, supra at 168. But
where there is no divorce or legal separation, the wife's support rights do not qualify as
consideration. Estate of Robert M. McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956).
E.T. 19 also provides that the reasonable value of support rights for the children of the
parties is consideration in the divorce context. This same result had been previously
reached on the ground that the support right of a child is not one of the wife's marital
rights and consequently is outside the scope of 2043(b). Helvering v. United States Trust
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qualify as a sale. Thus, a husband who retains the forbidden controls may be
forced to include in his estate the value of the alimony corpus in excess of the
value of the wife's support right.9 ' In computing the tax, however, the estate
may take a credit for any gift tax paid on the original transfer,92 and perhaps
also a deduction under section 2053. 93
Alimony trusts can be considered a main target of section 2037. A com-
mon provision in such trusts is: "To wife for life, remainder to children, but
if she predeceases husband, or remarries before his death, then to him."'94 If
the value of the husband's reversion is five per cent or more, and it will be if
they are approximately the same age,95 the trust is taxable under 2037. And
the husband's estate must include the value of the remainder. To avoid a
section 2037 pitfall the husband must relinquish any rights to receive the
property if he survives the wife.
While a husband may forego the powers condemned by sections 2037 and
2038, it is questionable whether he can escape section 2036. There are no re-
ported cases testing a trust for the support of a divorced or separated wife
under section 2036. But in a different context, the Second Circuit held that
a husband retained a life estate in a trust by directing that the income be paid
Co., supra. Amounts set by the parties will not, on a theory of arm's length negotiation,
be accepted as the reasonable value of those rights, because the parties are commonly in-
terested in the support of their children. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621,
626-27 (8th Cir. 1955). Moreover, release of the right to custody of a minor child and
to any of his future earnings will not be consideration for estate tax purposes. Estate of
Rosalean B. Ottmann, 12 T.C. 1118 (1949).
91. The taxpayer could argue that all property transferred to the wife pursuant to
court decrce is for "adequate and full consideration," pointing to cases holding such a
claim deductible against the estate. See notes 104-113 infra and accompanying text. The
only time this argument was attempted, the court accepted it but ruled against the tax-
payer on another ground. Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). However, the analogy is weak since a claim based on a court decree can be
deducted without regard to consideration; only claims based on a "promise or agreement"
require proof of consideration. Section 2053(c) (1) (A).
A stronger argument would be that § 2516, dealing with the analogous gift tax prob-
lem, shows a congressional intent to view divorce as an exception to the restrictions of
2043(b). See Commissioner v. Watson's Estate, 216 F.2d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1954);
LOV NDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 322-23 (1956) ; Taylor, Effect of
Propcrtv Settlements Incident to Divorce, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. FED. TAX. 305, 313-14
(1955).
92. Scction 2012 allows a credit against the estate tax for any gift tax paid on prop-
ertr which is later included in the taxable estate. 2 BEvERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION
311-15 (1956). The credit, however, does not include interest the transferor has lost on
the gift tax payment to the Government. foreover, § 2012 offers no relief to a husband
who used his gift tax exemption for the marital transfer and thereby paid a higher tax
on later transfers.
93. See notes 104-13 infra and accompanying tex-t.
94. See, e.g., the trusts litigated in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1940).
95. Thus, where the grantor dies at 72 and his wife is then 65, the value of his rever-
sion is 28.29% of the value of the property. 2 RABKIN & JoHNsoN, FEDERA l INcomE
Girt AND ESTATE TAXATION 5621 (1954).
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to his wife for her support and maintenance. 96 Since the payments from the
trust satisfied the husband's obligation of support, he was regarded the real
income beneficiary of the trusty. On the same theory, a husband may be con-
sidered the income beneficiary of an alimony trust: insofar as the husband's
obligation of support survives the creation of the trust, the payments to the
wife discharge a continuing indebtedness. 98 However, even under this view
of section 2036, a husband should be free from the estate tax if the creation of
the trust extinguishes his duty of support.99 Since the liability of the husband
terminates at the trust's creation, he cannot be considered income beneficiary
at the time of his death. This argument had an analogue in the income tax
field before the 1942 amendments. Reasoning that the husband is constructive
beneficiary of an alimony trust only if the income is devoted to the payment
of his indebtedness, the Supreme Court held that he is not taxable on income
from a trust whose creation extinguished his obligation of support. 00
Estate tax discrimination against trusts which fail to extinguish the
husband's support obligation, however, is unjustified. The policy underlying
section 2036 is to tax inter vivos substitutes for testamentary transfers."'
Tested against this purpose, the fact that the husband remains liable
after the creation of a trust is immaterial. Accordingly, all alimony
trusts should be similarly viewed under 2036. This consistency should
be effectuated by exempting all alimony trusts from the section. For absent a
retention of 2037 or 2038 controls, an alimony trust is no more a substitute
for a testamentary transfer than is any inter vivos transfer in which the grantor
creates a life estate in one party and a remainder in another. Furthermore, the
present income tax provisions afford additional support for not applying 2036
to alimony trusts: the husband is no longer treated as income beneficiary of
an alimony trust that fails to extinguish his obligation of support. 10 2
96. Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953). See Rudick, Inter
Vivos Gifts-Traps and Pitfalls, 1954 TULANE TAX INsT. 393, 411-13.
97. See 1 BEVERIDGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION 316-17 (1956).
98. See 2 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDaAL TAXATION 5241-42 (1954); LOWNDES &
KRA-MER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 146 (1956):
"Although the income from an alimony trust is taxable to the spouse to whom
the income is paid, and for income tax purposes is no longer regarded as the income
of the spouse who created the trust, it is difficult to see anything which would pre-
vent the trust from being taxed to the estate of the creator of the trust under Sec-
tion 2036(a) of the estate tax, provided that the creation of the trust did not ex-
tinguish his obligation to support the beneficiary of the trust .... "
99. In pre-1942 income tax cases, the test used was whether "local law and the
alimony trust have given the divorced husband a full discharge and leave no continuing
obligation however contingent." Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149, 156 (1940).
100. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69 (1940) ; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 84
(1940). See Paul, supra note 55.
101. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 640-42, 644-46 (1949). See
Bittker, Church and Spiegel: The Legislative Sequel, 59 YALE L.J. 395, 397-401 (1950).
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 682. See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying
text; 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 516-24 (Henderson ed. 1949); Gornick,
Alimony and the Iiwome Tax, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 28, 42-45 (1943).
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Assuming, however, that an alimony trust falls within sections 2036 through
203S, the husband's estate may not have to pay a tax on the entire affected
portion. In addition to excluding the property "sold" for the wife's right of
support, the estate may be able to deduct the property allocable to the wife's
dower rights or their statutory substitutes. Although the Code expressly pro-
vides that the relinquishment of these rights does not constitute considera-
tion,103 section 2053, permitting deduction of claims in computing the taxable
estate, requires consideration only for claims founded upon a promise or agree-
ment.10 4 Reasoning that this requirement of consideration is exclusive, courts
have allowed the deduction of a claim to the husband's property that is based
upon court decree rather than the agreement of the parties. 10 5
Confusion, paralleling the debate in the gift tax field over the meaning of
Harris,10 6 has arisen where the parties have negotiated a property settlement
and submitted it to the divorce court for approval. The Supreme Court's
position on the gift tax in Harris suggests that an estate tax deduction should
be allowed where the settlement: was arranged in contemplation of divorce,
was to become effective only upon approval of the divorce court, and was
ratified and incorporated into the divorce decree.10 7 To some lower courts,
however, the absence of any one of these features bars deductibility. Thus the
Tax Court has held that no deduction is permissible if the divorce court did
not have power to modify a non-fraudulent agreement between the parties. 08
Similar results have followed where the settlement was enforceable before the
divorce decree and remained contractually enforceable thereafter. 10 9
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has refused to adopt so restrictive
an interpretation. To this court, the prohibition on deduction of claims in con-
sideration of the wife's dower rights was intended merely to deny specious
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043 (b).
104. Section 2053 (c) (1) (A). The "promise or agreement" limitation was inserted
in 1932 to insure the deductibility of "liabilities imposed by law or arising out of torts."
H.R. REP.. No. 708, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), set out in 1939-1 Cum. BULL. Part 2,
at 491.
105. Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942) (no evi-
dence of agreement of parties). Cf. Commissioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1947) (gift tax).
106. See notes 29-42 sipra and accompanying text.
107. See Rev. Rul. 54-29, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 186, where the Harris criteria are set
forth as grounds for deduction of wife's claim to life insurance proceeds.
108. Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C. 911 (1955).
109. Bank of New York v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 375, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The weight of pre-Harris cases is against this decision. See Commissioner v. Maresi, 156
F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. W. Va.), aff'd,
145 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Estate of Silas B. Mason, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941); Edythe C.
Young, 39 B.T.A. 230 (1939); Angus 0. Swink, P-H 1945 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1 45169, aff'd,
IS5 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1946). But cf. Krause v. Yoke, 89 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. W. Va. 1950).
In many states a property settlement that becomes effective only if divorce is obtained
is invalid. 1 NELSON, DIVoRcE AND ANNULMENT 506-07 (2d ed. 1945). Decisions such as
Bank of New York, supra, and Bowers, sapra note 108, would make deductibility virtually
impossible in those jurisdictions.
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claims." 0 The fact of divorce coupled with court approval of the financial
terms are sufficient safeguards against fraud."' The 1948 amendments to the
estate tax enabling a decedent to leave half of his estate tax free to his surviv-
ing spouse 112 provide an additional reason for a liberal approach toward
deductions of marital settlements. In view -of this treatment, the husband who
is allowed to deduct a marital settlement no longer has a tax advantage over
the husband who remains married." 3
In sum, an alimony trust may be included in the husband's estate. But a
deduction will be allowed for the value of the wife's right to support and, if
the transfer is approved by the divorce court, possibly for the value of her
dower rights as well. In general, this means that the maximum includible will
be the value of the interests given to third parties. If alimony trusts are
exempted from 2036, their inclusion in the taxable estate on other grounds is
reasonable. Sections 2037 and 2038 cover only the property over which the
grantor has retained such control that the transfer is equivalent to a testa-
mentary gift." 4 If, however, 2036 is construed to tax a remainder that has
been given outright to a third party, it will only be because income imputed
to the wife for income tax purposes has been attributed to the husband for the
estate tax. To this extent, the husband can suffer a tax disadvantage from a
trust without possessing any of the controls that the estate tax condemns.
CONCLUSION
Turning often upon formal distinctions, the tax consequences of alimony
trusts are unusually complex. Factors, such as whether a trust has been
approved by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether the creation of the
trust discharges the support obligation, or whether the parties are divorced
rather than separated may be of vital significance for income, gift and estate
tax purposes. The parties would be ill-advised to choose an alimony trust
without considering these problems. Yet until Congress, the courts or the
Commissioner clarify some of the uncertain areas, a choice may have to be
based largely upon conjecture about tax consequences.
A few generalizations, however, seem valid. If the husband is the benefi-
ciary of a pre-existing trust, he may satisfy his marital obligations without
adverse tax effects by assigning his interest to his wife. If the interest assigned
is merely a life estate, he need not recognize gain upon the transfer. Moreover,
by fitting within section 2516 or the Harris rationale he will be able to avoid
110. Commissioner v. Watson's Estate, 216 F.2d 941, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1954) (agree-
mebt was not contingent on divorce).
111. Ibid.
112. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(a),(c). See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the
Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1125-36 (1948).
113. This is so unless the husband remarries and leaves half of his estate to the new
wife. In that case he will be able to exceed the marital deduction by approximately half
the value of the settlement with the first wife.
114. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXES 121-23, 171 (1956).
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a gift tax. And unless the husband also had control over the remainder follow-
ing his life estate, the trust can not be includible in his estate under section
2036. Only in the income tax field, is there a possibility of tax disadvantages.
If the trust distributes corpus or tax-free income, the wisdom of the assign-
ment will turn upon the relative tax brackets of husband and wife.
The creation of an alimony trust may be more costly. The transfer of appre-
ciated property may result in capital gains tax. While the problem of qualify-
ing under section 2516 and Harris is the same as in the case of a pre-existing
trust, a remainder to a third person will always be a taxable gift. Moreover,
unless the husband can fund the trust initially with sufficient property to
satisfy the wife's demand from income alone, he is caught in a dilemma be-
tween the income and estate taxes. For income tax benefits can be maximized
only by remaining personally liable for the income deficiencies of the trust. Yet
such a procedure may bring the trust within section 2036 of the estate tax.
